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Abstract: 
We investigate, using the 2002 US Health and Retirement Study, the factors influencing 
individuals’ insecurity and expectations about terrorism, and study the effects these last have 
on households’ portfolio choices and spending patterns. We find that females, the religiously 
devout, those equipped with a better memory, the less educated, and those living close to 
where the events of September 2001 took place worry a lot about their safety. In addition, fear 
of terrorism discourages households from investing in stocks, mostly through the high levels 
of insecurity felt by females. Insecurity due to terrorism also makes single men less likely to 
own a business. Finally, we find evidence of expenditure shifting away from recreational 
activities that can potentially leave one exposed to a terrorist attack and towards goods that 
might help one cope with the consequences of terrorism materially (increased use of car and 
spending on the house) or psychologically (spending on personal care products by females in 
couples). 
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   1 
I.  Introduction 
Terrorist attacks represent major shocks for a country’s economy that are beyond 
the control of economic agents and can have severe consequences both at the macro and 
the micro level. While analysis of macroeconomic data can be useful in understanding the 
economic implications of terrorism, it can not shed light on the effect of the fear of 
terrorism  on  spending  and  portfolio  choices  at  the  household  level.  Yet,  households’ 
economic decisions under the threat of terrorism can have important implications for 
aggregate consumption, asset demands and asset pricing.   
  A common feature of most existing studies of the economic effects of terrorism is 
the  use  of  aggregate  data  (Frey,  Luechinger  and  Stutzer,  2004,  provide  an  extensive 
review). For example, Enders and Sandler (1991) and Drakos and Kutan (2003) have 
found strong negative effects of terrorist attacks on tourism, Enders and Sandler (1996) 
on foreign direct investment and Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) on international trade. 
Furthermore,  Eckstein  and  Tsiddon  (2004),  using  quarterly  data  for  Israel,  find  that 
periods of high terrorist activity have a negative impact on aggregate output, investment, 
consumption  and  exports.  However,  these  periods  may  partly  reflect  the  influence  of 
related political developments that took place at the same time (see Cukierman, 2004), 
which could be a problem affecting any study of terrorism using aggregate data.  
In this paper we use US household survey data from the Health and Retirement 
Study  (HRS),  which  interviews  those  aged  50  and  above  and  offers  information  on 
people’s perceived sense of security in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 
and  the  anthrax  attacks  that  took  place  in  the  US  shortly  thereafter.  Moreover, 
respondents are asked about their expectation of future bioterrorism incidents and the 
possibility of being a victim of such attacks. This directly provided information may be 
very revealing, since different individuals can perceive the same event in a variety of 
ways  depending  on  their  personal  traits  and  circumstances,  and  such  heterogeneous 
perceptions can lead to quite disparate economic decisions. Furthermore, it is important 
to  understand  the  consequences  of  such  extreme  events  on  the  choices  of  the  older 
segment of the population, given that it controls a large share of society’s resources (and 
therefore  their  economic  decisions  can  significantly  affect  the  relevant  markets).  In 
addition,  older  households  face  challenges  such  as  an  increasingly  difficult  access  to   2 
credit, a relatively inflexible labor supply, adverse health shocks and the need to secure 
adequate resources for retirement. 
There exist micro-data studies in the fields of political science, psychology and  
medicine, that have investigated the effects of terrorism on individuals (see Galea, Ahern, 
Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvalas, Gold and Vlahov, 2002; Huddy,  Feldman, Taber  and 
Lahav, 2005; Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin and Gil-Rivas, 2002; Boscarino, Adams, 
Figley, Galea and Foa, 2006; Lavanco, Romano and Milio, 2008). These studies have 
often relied on small-scale surveys that were conducted in areas immediately affected by 
the 9/11 attacks,
1 and they find that being younger, female, with lower education and 
living closer to the site of the events, all increase the anxious reactions to the 9/11 attacks 
and terrorism in general.
2 In the field of economics, Becker and Rubinstein (2004) have 
examined  the  labor  supply  and  wages  of  Israeli  workers  who  might  be  exposed  to 
terrorism,  using  aggregate  data  on  suicide  attacks  and  their  victims  to  proxy  for  the 
danger faced by individuals. 
We  build  on  these  earlier  studies  by  using  the  HRS,  which  is  a  nationally 
representative US household survey that provides much more extensive information on 
demographic, social and economic characteristics of the respondents (e.g. on depression, 
cognitive abilities, religious attachment, veteran status and economic resources) than the 
surveys used in those earlier studies. This wealth of information allows us to investigate 
more thoroughly the factors that shape individuals’ perceptions about terrorism. More 
importantly, our paper is the first one, as far as we know, that uses information directly 
provided by survey respondents on such perceptions in order to examine their effect on a 
number  of  important  household  economic  choices  involving  asset  investment  and 
expenditure. 
Due to terrorism, households face a largely undiversifiable risk of loss of life and 
of  severe  economic  damages,  which  has  a  very  low  probability.  These  damages  can 
come,  among  other  things,  from  job  loss,  destruction  of  property  and  increased 
expenditures needed to cope with the consequences of terrorism. As is known from Pratt 
                                                 
1 Huddy, Feldman and Cassese (2007) and Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin and Gil-Rivas (2002) are 
exceptions, since they use nationally representative surveys. 
2 With respect to firms, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) found that the stock price of those that operated 
mostly in the Basque country in Spain exhibited higher returns in a period of truce with the Basque terrorist 
organization ETA.   3 
(1964), a decrease in wealth will make an individual more risk averse if her preferences 
exhibit  decreasing  absolute  risk  aversion  (DARA).  Furthermore,  Leland  (1968)  and 
Sandmo (1970) have shown that a positive third derivative of the utility function induces 
precautionary saving in response to background risk. Finally, the results of Gollier and 
Pratt (1996) indicate that increased exposure to an undiversifiable background risk should 
reduce the exposure to avoidable risks, even if the two risks are independent.
3 Guiso, 
Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996), based on Italian survey data, find that households with 
higher uncertainty about their future wages adopt a more conservative portfolio strategy, 
lending empirical support to the above premise. In our context, the above findings imply 
that terrorism can lead households to increase their saving and reduce their exposure to 
risky assets.  
Households’  economic  response  to  terrorism  may  also  be  the  outcome  of 
deviations from the standard expected utility framework. According to prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), agents are more sensitive to gains than losses and tend to   
overweigh  events  occurring  with  very  low  probabilities.
4  In  our  context,  these 
propositions would suggest that households may worry inordinately about losing their life 
and property due to terrorism. As a result, they might make very conservative economic 
choices, with a particular emphasis on avoiding losses.  
In our study, we initially document the considerable heterogeneity of perceptions 
about terrorism in the population, and correlate them with various personal and economic 
characteristics of the survey respondents. We find that women feel much higher levels of 
insecurity and report a higher probability of becoming victims of a bioterrorist attack. 
The same holds for the less educated, those for whom religion is more important, those 
with worse numeracy skills, those with no military experience and those who live close to 
where the  events of September 2001 took place.  In  contrast, the better educated, the 
veterans, the less religious and those with a higher income consider a bioterrorist attack 
in the US more likely to happen and worry less about their personal safety. In addition, 
                                                 
3 This holds for the class of preferences exhibiting risk vulnerability, which is a stronger notion than DARA 
and can be seen as a more general case of: i) proper risk aversion, i.e. the notion that a newly introduced 
risk has a negative impact on the attitude towards other independent risks (see Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987);  
ii) standard risk aversion, under which any risk that makes a small reduction in wealth more painful - in the 
sense of decreased expected utility - also makes any independent risk more painful (see Kimball, 1993). 
4 Barberis and Huang (2005) provide a review of the implications of prospect theory and loss aversion on 
stock market participation and the equity premium.   4 
we  find  evidence  that  the  passage  of  time  and  a  reduced  memory  capacity  tend  to 
alleviate the insecurity created by the 9/11 attacks, but they do not seem to influence the 
fear of being a victim of bioterrorism. 
We then turn to household economic decisions and find that the fear of terrorism 
strongly  discourages  households  from  investing  in  stocks  through  the  high  levels  of 
insecurity  that  females  feel.  This  finding  is  net  of  a  number  of  demographic  and 
economic factors that are likely to be correlated with gender, like the general attitude 
towards risk, the level of depression, education and economic resources. When it comes 
to entrepreneurial risk, we observe that insecurity due to terrorism makes single men 
quite less likely to own a business. Finally, we find that fear of terrorism also induces 
females to buy life insurance. 
As for households’ spending decisions, insecurity and expectations about future 
terrorist attacks do not seem to influence either the total level of non-durable expenditure 
or the budget shares of some basic goods (food at home, clothing, medical services and 
utilities). However, we find strong evidence that households shift their expenditure away 
from items (e.g. travel, movie-going and gyms) that require more time spent in public 
places and a more frequent use of means of transportation such as airplanes and trains, 
which  could  be  considered  as  likely  targets  of  terrorist  attacks.  Moreover,  given  that 
spending on such recreational goods is typically elastic, they are more likely to be among 
those  that  will  be  negatively  affected  by  an  expected  future  reduction  in  economic 
resources. On the other hand, we find that households spend more on items that might 
help  them  better  cope  with  the  consequences  of  terrorism  either  materially  (more 
intensive use of the car, increased spending on the house) or psychologically (spending 
on personal care products by females). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides details on the 
data and on the questions related to terrorism found therein. Section III presents results 
on the impact of various socio-economic characteristics on the insecurity due to and the 
expectations  about  terrorism.  Section  IV  explores  the  link  of  the  terrorism-related 
variables with household portfolio decisions while Section V with household spending. 
Section VI concludes.   5 
II.  Data and questions on terrorism 
We use data from the HRS, which is a longitudinal, nationally representative dataset 
interviewing those aged 50 and above in the US. The survey, conducted on a biannual 
basis  since  1992,  provides  extensive  information  on  households’  socioeconomic 
characteristics, income and assets (for a detailed description of the survey see Hauser and 
Willis,  2004).
5  In  the  6
th  wave  of  the  HRS,  which  was  conducted  from  April  2002 
through  January  2003  and  during  which  17,549  individuals  belonging  to  11,770 
households  were  interviewed,  respondents  are  asked  three  questions  regarding  their 
expectations about terrorism and the degree to which they have been affected by the 9/11 
attacks.  
The first question (Q1) is as follows: “How much -if any- have the events of 
September 11 shaken your own personal sense of safety and security: have they shaken it 
a great deal, a good amount, not too much, or not at all?”. Therefore, this question asks 
explicitly  about  the  effect  of  the  biggest  terrorist  attack  in  US  territory  on  the 
respondents’ sense of security, which is presumably influenced by terrorist threats of 
every  kind.  In  our  HRS  sample,  17%  of  the  respondents  report  feeling  no  insecurity 
whatsoever, 42% not too much insecurity, 24% a good amount of insecurity and 17% a 
great deal of insecurity. 
Survey respondents were then asked: “What do you think is the percent chance 
that there will be a major incident of bio-terrorism in the United States in the next five 
years, directly affecting 100 people or more?”. This question (Q2) records the subjective 
probability of a future terrorist attack of a specific kind in the US in general, and thus 
should reflect less the respondents’ fear for their wellbeing than the first question. The 
distribution of the answers to Q2 in the HRS sample is as follows: the 25
th percentile is 
equal to 50 percentage points (pp), the 50
th equal to 60 pp, the 75
th equal to 80 pp, while 
the mean is equal to 61 pp.
6 
Finally, the third question (Q3) was: “What do you think is the percent chance 
that you, yourself will be a victim of bio-terrorism in the next five years?”. This question 
measures respondents’ fear of dying from a specific type of terrorist attack and may be 
                                                 
5 For our analysis, we mostly rely on the HRS files created by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging. 
6 Khwaja, Sloan and Salm (2006) have examined this question when investigating the relationship between 
smoking and subjective beliefs about various future macroeconomic events.   6 
seen as a special case of the Q1 since it asks about one possible aspect of the insecurity 
associated with terrorism.
7  The 25
th percentile of the distribution of this expectation is 
equal to 0 pp, the 50
th equal to 10 pp, the 75
th equal to 30 pp and the mean equal to 19 
pp.
8 A median value of 10 pp for this probability seems implausibly high, given what is 
known about the frequency and the extent of the damage caused by such attacks (see 
Tucker,  1999,  for  historical  evidence  on  this  issue).  As  already  discussed,  this 
overestimation of the probability of a catastrophic event is consistent with the tenets of 
prospect theory. 
Since the three questions on terrorism are asked only in the 2002 HRS, we have to 
operate in a cross-sectional setting. However, given the panel nature of the survey, one 
has information on the 2002 respondents from previous waves, which we will use below 
in order to address issues arising in the estimation of our econometric models. 
 
III.  Factors influencing insecurity and expectations about terrorism 
In this section we explore the extent to which various demographic, social and 
economic factors influence the perceived level of insecurity, as well as the subjective 
expectations of a future bioterrorist attack in the US and of being a victim of such an 
attack.  This  exercise  can  shed  light  on  what  makes  an  individual  more  sensitive  to 
terrorist threats and hence be informative to policy makers.  
In our empirical specification, we first include standard demographic variables 
like age, marital status, labor force status and race. In addition, we account for income 
and wealth (typically not recorded in surveys used to study the reactions to the threat of 
terrorism),  since  they  might  have  an  independent  role  in  shaping  perceptions  about 
terrorism. This could be possible because wealthier individuals may protect themselves 
better against terrorism incidents (e.g. by getting higher quality medical care or moving 
to a safer place). Economic resources are also very likely to be correlated with other 
                                                 
7 However, respondents’ expectations about bioterrorism incidents could also reflect their views on other 
types of attacks. In a survey conducted in New York during the same period as the 2002 HRS, respondents 
were as concerned about biological attacks as they were about chemical ones or any future major terrorism 
incident. On the other hand, they found nuclear attacks less likely (Boscarino, Adams, Figley, Galea and 
Foa, 2006). 
8 Those who answer zero to Q2 or Q3 are asked a follow up question about the probability being less, equal 
or greater than a very small threshold (1/1,000 for Q2 and 1/1,000,000 for Q3). In both cases, the vast 
majority of respondents choose the “less than” option.   7 
regressors  like  gender,  education  and  cognitive  abilities,  and  thus  their  inclusion  is 
important for the consistency of our estimates. 
Gender can be another important factor influencing perceptions about terrorism. 
The  notion  that  women  develop  fears  related  to  physical  threats  (both  personal  and 
national) in a different way than men is empirically supported by various earlier studies. 
For example, research on crime has shown that women are more afraid than men of being 
victims of crime, although they are less likely to experience a violent assault (see for 
example  Warr,  1984  and  Ferraro,  1996).  In  addition,  women  appear  more  concerned 
about  national  threats.  Poikolainen,  Kanerva  and  Lönnqvist  (1998)  find  that  Finish 
women in the early nineties were more afraid of the likelihood of a nuclear war, while 
Arian and Gordon (1993) document significantly higher fear and anxiety among Israeli 
women during the Gulf war. With respect to fear caused by terrorism, Silver, Holman, 
McIntosh, Poulin and Gil-Rivas (2002) show that females have experienced much higher 
levels of posttraumatic stress symptoms in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Solomon, 
Gelkopf and Bleich (2005) report similar findings for Israeli women and estimate the 
odds of developing posttraumatic stress symptoms after terrorist attacks to be six times 
higher than those of men. In a recent study, Huddy, Feldman and Cassese (2007), using 
US  data  from  the  National  Terrorism  and  Threat  survey,  find  that  women  are  more 
concerned about the consequences of both terrorism and war. More generally, a range of 
studies  have  offered  evidence  on  the  links  between  gender  and  emotional  reactions 
involving fear, worry, anxiety and depression (see for example Robichaud, Dugas and 
Conway, 2003).  
In order to account for the influence of personal pessimism on perceptions about 
terrorist threats, we include a dummy for feeling depressed most of the time over the 
week prior to the interview. Political and religious beliefs can also be important for the 
study of the aforementioned perceptions, but unfortunately our data does not provide any 
information on the former. With respect to the latter, we have information on whether the 
respondents are Catholics, Protestants, Jewish, followers of other religions or have no   8 
religious  preference.  Moreover,  we  control  for  the  strength  of  religious  beliefs  by 
including a dummy for those who declare that religion is very important in their lives.
9  
We  use  as  an  additional  regressor  an  objective  health  indicator,  namely  the 
number of activities of daily living (ADLs) that the respondent has difficulties with. Such 
functional limitations are likely to make an individual less able to protect herself in case 
of an emergency but also less mobile and therefore less exposed to a terrorism incident 
that  may  occur  in  a  public  venue.  Moreover,  our  dataset  provides  information  on 
respondents’  cognitive  abilities  that  is  not  typically  available  in  most  surveys.  Such 
information can be very relevant since cognitive abilities may influence how individuals 
recall and process information and subsequently form their perceptions about terrorism. 
We use as a measure of respondents’ mathematical skills the number of correct answers 
to a numeracy test (five successive subtractions of the same number), and as a measure of 
their memory capacity the number of words correctly recalled out of a list of ten that is 
read to them by the interviewer.  
Education  could  also  shape  perceptions  about  terrorism,  since  more  educated 
individuals typically have easier and wider access to information related to terrorism (e.g. 
experts’  evaluations  of  terrorist  threats),  and  they  may  also  be  able  to  process  such 
information more efficiently. Moreover, we distinguish those who make regular use of 
the internet (another important source of information), from those who do not. We also 
use respondents’ visits to their neighbors as an indicator of sociability and integration to 
the local community, and include a dummy for veteran status because those with military 
experience may evaluate terrorist threats differently than the rest of the population. 
The  place  of  a  respondent’s  residence  could  influence  her  views  and  feelings 
about terrorist threats, especially if it is perceived as a likely target of a terrorist attack. 
Due to privacy concerns, the most disaggregated information about place of residence 
that we can use refers to the US Census divisions.
10 Finally, we examine how answers to 
the  terrorism-related  questions  are  affected  by  the  time  elapsed  (measured  as  the 
logarithm  of  months)  between  the  survey  interview  and  September  2001.  We  would 
                                                 
9 One should note that having no religious preference is not equivalent to claiming that religion does not 
play an important role in one’s life, since 21% of those with no religious preference state the opposite.  
10 These are: i) New England (used as the base category in our specifications); ii) Middle Atlantic (which 
includes New York); iii) South Atlantic (which includes the District of Columbia); iv) East North Central; 
v) East South Central; vi) West North Central; vii) West South Central; viii) Mountain; ix) Pacific.   9 
expect that the longer this time distance is, the less intense the insecurity due to terrorism 
should be. 
The  distribution  of  the  answers  to  the  three  terrorism-related  questions  across 
different values of the socio-economic variables just discussed can be seen in Table 1. 
Columns 1 and 2 record the proportions of those who feel not at all insecure and very 
insecure respectively. Column 3 denotes the mean expectation of a bioterrorist attack in 
the US and column 4 the mean expectation of becoming a victim of bioterrorism.
11 We 
see that the insecurity due to terrorism and the expectation of being a victim are greater 
for those aged less than 65
12, females, the depressed, African Americans and other races, 
the less educated, the less well off, those who have not served in the military, those for 
whom religion is important, the Jewish, and those living in New England, in the Middle 
Atlantic and East South Central census divisions. There is less variability with respect to 
the expectation of a bioterrorist attack in the US in general, but it seems to be positively 
correlated  with  higher  education,  depression,  regular  use  of  the  Internet,  and  larger 
economic resources.  
When deciding which statistical models are appropriate for the three terrorism 
questions, the choice concerning Q1 is straightforward: since the answer can only be one 
of four ranked alternatives, we can use  an ordered probit model. On the other hand, 
answers to Q2 and Q3 denote probabilities, and thus can take values ranging between 
zero and one.
13 These bounds imply that a statistical model of these probabilities should 
feature a conditional mean that is nonlinear in the regressors since as this mean gets 
closer  to  the  bounds,  changes  in  the  regressors  should  influence  it  less  and  less.  In 
contrast, a linear model produces a constant effect of the regressors across all ranges of 
the  conditional  mean,  thus  overestimating  the  effect  for  sample  units  with  predicted 
means close to the bounds. In addition, nothing prevents a linear model from predicting 
out of range.  
                                                 
11 The median values for Q2 are close to the average ones, while the median value of Q3 is equal to 10 pp 
for all characteristics. 
12 Since we are using a cross-section, we cannot really distinguish age from cohort effects. 
13 Respondents give answers to Q2 and Q3 ranging from zero to one hundred, which we normalize to lie 
between zero and one. Given that these answers can equal zero, using a logarithmic transformation of the 
two expectation variables is not advisable (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996).   10 
In order to address the aforementioned issues affecting Q2 and Q3, we use the 
fractional variable model of Papke and Wooldridge (1996, henceforth PW), who assume 
that the mean of the variable of interest conditional on the regressors x is equal to G(xβ), 
where G is the cumulative standard normal distribution and β a vector of parameters. PW 
use a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation strategy that, under this assumption, results 
in  consistent  estimates  (Gourieroux,  Monfort  and  Trognon,  1984).  The  quasi  ML 
estimation needs to be performed by using a member of the linear exponential family of 
distributions, and we follow PW in choosing the Bernoulli distribution. Hence, the log 
likelihood of an individual i reporting an answer yi to Q2 or Q3 is given by:   
 
)) G( ( ) y ( ) G( y ) l(y i i i β x β x i i − − + = 1 ln 1 ln  
 
The quasi ML approach proposed by PW has been found to perform very well in 
estimation problems involving fractional variables (Kieschnick and McCullough, 2003) 
and requires no additional assumptions about other features of the data generating process 
(e.g. about the variance of the errors, which are heteroskedastic as the conditional mean 
approaches zero or one). Therefore, standard errors of the estimates need to be corrected 
for possible misspecifications of the likelihood, and hence we obtain them by using 500 
bootstrap replications.  
Marginal effects from our estimation are shown in Table 2 (more details on the 
calculation of marginal effects can be found in Appendix A.1).
14 In columns 1 and 2 we 
display the effects and their standard errors on the probability of not feeling insecure at 
all due to terrorism, while in columns 3 and 4 we display the corresponding magnitudes 
for  the  probability  of  feeling  very  insecure.  Columns  5  and  6  show  the  results 
corresponding to the expectation asked in Q2 and columns 7 and 8 those for Q3. For age, 
numeracy  and recall scores, number of ADLs  and number of months  since 9/11, the 
marginal effects show the change in the relevant magnitude when the variable changes by 
one unit. 
                                                 
14 We do not show any regression coefficients since in the case of nonlinear models they contain little 
quantitative information (they are available from the authors upon request).   11 
Women’s sense of security seems to have been greatly shaken as a result of the 
9/11 attacks, since they are more likely by almost 10 pp to report that they feel very 
insecure. They also think that there is a higher chance (7 pp) of being a victim of a future 
bioterrorism incident, while there is no difference between them and males with respect 
to the expectation of a bioterrorist attack in the US in general. These results provide 
further  support  to  the  aforementioned  existing  findings  about  gender  differences  in 
insecurity, and show that such differences persist even after controlling for education, 
depression, cognitive abilities and economic resources.  
Depression,  which  is  likely  to  result  in  a  pessimistic  outlook  on  life,  affects 
responses in all three questions. Those suffering from depression are more likely to feel 
very insecure (6.3 pp), to anticipate that a bioterrorist attack will take place the next five 
years in the US (3.9 pp) and to be victims of such attacks (2.4 pp).  
Race also seems to have a large effect on the terrorism-related variables, given 
that  African  Americans  assign  a  much  lower  probability  than  whites  to  a  major 
bioterrorist attack taking place in the US in the next five years (8 pp). On the other hand, 
African  Americans  are  more  likely  by  6.3  pp  to  feel  insecure  as  a  result  of  9/11. 
However, they are as likely as whites to expect to be victims of bioterrorism. Other races 
differ from whites mainly on the general expectation about a bioterrorist attack in the US 
(its effect is smaller by 3.9 pp).     
A college graduate exhibits a significantly lower probability (4.6 pp) to declare 
that  her  personal  sense  of  security  has  been  greatly  shaken  by  the  9/11  attacks.  The 
general expectation of a bioterrorist attack in the next five years is higher for high school 
graduates (1.9 pp) relative to their less than high school counterparts, while the effect is 
not statistically significant for those with a college degree. On the other hand, when asked 
about the expectation of being a victim of such an attack, college-educated individuals 
report a lower probability (1.3 pp, significant at 10%). The negative correlation between 
educational attainment and perceived level of security could be attributed to the increased 
capacity of the better educated to realize that terrorist attacks are very low probability 
events.  Similar  results  are  derived  for  those  who  make  regular  use  of  the  internet, 
suggesting  that  access  to  more  information  is  not  translated  into  higher  fear  and 
insecurity.    12 
Veterans find a major bioterrorism incident more likely to happen in the next five 
years by 2.6 pp, and their personal sense of security is less affected by the 9/11 attacks by 
1.3 pp (significant at 10%). This result could mean that experience in the military makes 
one more attuned to the threats facing the country in general and also more likely to 
realize that being victimized from a terrorist attack is statistically not very probable.  
Economic resources do not seem to have a significant influence on the personal 
sense of security. On the other hand, household income is positively correlated with the 
general expectation of a major bioterrorist attack in the next five years: individuals at the 
top income quartile assign a higher probability (4.4 pp) to this event. When it comes to 
the risk to the respondent’s life, economic resources do not play any role. The above 
results  point  to  the  development  of  differing  concerns  about  terrorist  threats  across 
population  groups:  on  the  one  hand,  the  less  educated  and  those  without  military 
experience appear more worried about their personal security while veterans, the better 
educated and the better off consider a bioterrorist attack in US territory as more likely to 
happen.
15 
 The literature on the fear of crime has pointed out that frequent contacts with 
neighbors can reduce apprehension by strengthening the feelings of interpersonal trust 
(see Crawford, 1997). However, our results challenge those findings, since they suggest 
that those who have such contacts have a higher probability (2.7 pp) to declare that their 
personal sense of security has been greatly affected by the events of 9/11. This could be 
due to the fact that a terrorist attack is an event against which one can not be protected 
through  good  relationships  with  neighbors  and  integration  to  the  local  community. 
Instead, such contacts seem to intensify the perceived threat from terrorism, maybe by 
mutual reinforcement of fear.  
 The importance of religion has a large effect on the feeling of personal insecurity 
(3.4 pp) as well as on the expectations of a bioterrorist attack in the US (1.5 pp) and of 
being  a  victim  of  bioterrorism  (2.9  pp).  However,  conditional  on  the  importance  of 
religion, we do not find any significant influence of particular religious faiths on the 
answers to any of the three terrorism questions, with the notable exception of Jewish 
                                                 
15 Various studies have found that people tend to separate their personal concerns from social or national 
issues (see for example Sears and Funk, 1991, and Funk, 2000).   
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respondents, who are much more likely than people of other faiths to feel both insecure 
due to terrorism (12.2 pp) and to expect to be victims of bioterrorist attacks (5 pp). 
We do not find any significant relationship of our objective health indicator and 
the personal sense of security or the fear of being a victim of bioterrorism. This suggests 
that  a  decreased  exposure  to  terrorist  attacks  due  to  mobility  problems  offsets  the 
presumably higher vulnerability felt by those who suffer from such problems. On the 
other hand, we find that each additional limitation in ADLs, increases the expectation that 
a bioterrorist attack will take place in the next five years by 0.9 pp.  
The time distance from the events of September 2001 seems to weaken the strong 
emotions  that  they  created,  given  that  each  additional  month  since  then  makes 
respondents  less  likely  to  be  insecure  by  0.3  pp  and  reduces  their  expectation  of  a 
bioterrorist attack by a similar magnitude. However, the passage of time does not seem to 
lessen  respondents’  fear  of  being  victims  of  a  bioterrorist  attack.  Interestingly,  better 
memory skills make respondents more likely to feel very insecure (one additional word 
recalled  adds  0.3  pp  to  the  probability)  and  increase  their  expectation  about  a  future 
bioterrorist attack (one word by 0.5 pp), possibly because a better memory makes it easier 
to recall the horror of the 9/11 attacks. These results are consistent with the notion (see 
Loewenstein, 1996) that vividly recalled traumatic events affect, either through temporal 
proximity or better memory, both the subjective expectations about them (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1973), as well as individuals’ emotional response to them (Miller, Levin, 
Kozak, Cook, McLean and Lang, 1987). On the other hand, the ability to perform basic 
numerical operations, which may reflect a better understanding of the objectively low 
probabilities to be directly affected by a terrorism incident, reduces both the sense of 
personal insecurity (one additional score point by 0.6 pp)  and the fear of being a victim 
of a bioterrorist attack (one point by 0.3 pp).  
We find quite significant regional effects on the answers to all three questions on 
terrorism. In particular, we find that the personal sense of security has been significantly 
less affected for respondents living in the four census divisions that are most distant from 
where the 9/11 attacks took place, namely in the Pacific, Mountain, West North Central 
and West South Central divisions (we also derive significant negative effects for the East 
North  Central  division).  In  contrast,  we  do  not  find  significant  differences  among   14 
respondents living in New England (the base region) and Middle and South Atlantic (all 
three regions were connected in one way or another to either the 9/11 or the subsequent 
anthrax attacks). These results may also be due to differences in the population density in 
those regions, given that a terrorism incident can have multiplicative effects in populated 
areas.
16 The picture is quite different for the general expectation of a bio terrorist attack 
that is estimated to be lower in all census divisions but the Mountain, compared to the 
base region. As for the likelihood of being a victim of a bioterrorist attack, those living in 
the Middle Atlantic and East South Central regions are as likely as those living in New 
England to report a higher probability than those who live in the remaining regions. All in 
all, our results suggest that the region of residence strongly influence the respondents’ 
perceptions  about  terrorism,  with  those  living  in  the  Northeast  being  generally  more 
worried than the rest of the population. 
We checked the robustness of the above results in a number of ways. First, it 
could be argued that depression is an endogenous variable, since it might be partly due to 
the fear of terrorism. Similarly, the importance of religion in the respondents’ lives could 
be  endogenous  if  fear  and  anxiety  about  terrorism  make  people  more  religiously 
observant.
17 Since both of these variables are binary indicators, we cannot use in the 
models  for  Q2  and  Q3  the  instrumental  variable  procedure  proposed  by  Papke  and 
Wooldridge  (2008),  which  can  be  implemented  only  for  endogenous  continuous 
regressors in the context of fractional variable models. In addition, instrumental variable 
estimation  in  an  ordered  probit  model  for  Q1  results  in  an  extremely  complicated 
likelihood function that is very difficult to make converge. Hence, in order to address this 
possible  endogeneity  issue  and  since  we  have  information  on  depression  and  the 
importance of religion from the 2000 HRS, we reestimated our models after substituting 
the lagged values of those two variables for the contemporaneous ones. The only change 
in the results concerned the effect of the importance of religion on the expectation of a 
bioterrorist attack in the US, which was somewhat reduced in value (1.0 pp instead of 1.5 
                                                 
16  New  England,  Middle  and  South  Atlantic  represent  the  three  most  densely  populated  areas,  while 
Mountain, West North Central and West South Central the least populated ones. 
17  According  to  a  Gallup  poll  however,  while  weekly  church  attendance  increased  significantly  in 
September  2001,  it  returned to  pre-9/11  levels  two  months  later  (see  http://www.newsbatch.com/rel-9-
11churchatt.html).     15 
pp) and in statistical significance (p-value: 0.088). All other marginal effects remained 
substantially unchanged. 
In  addition,  we  ran  simple  linear  regressions  for  Q2  and  Q3,  using  both  the 
contemporaneous and lagged values of the two possibly endogenous variables as well as 
linear instrumental variable regressions (using the lagged variables as instruments). For 
all  regressors,  we  find  very  similar  or,  in  some  cases,  larger  effects  from  the  linear 
models.
18 As already discussed, it is to be expected that a linear model will produce these 
larger effects, and hence our results from the PW models are likely to be conservative 
estimates of the influence of the respondents’ socio-economic characteristics on the two 
variables denoting expectations about terrorism.
19 
   
IV.  Household asset investment 
Households’  portfolio  decisions  can  have  important  implications  for  their 
economic welfare as well as for aggregate asset demands and asset pricing.
20 As a result, 
we find it worthwhile to examine whether the insecurity that terrorism generates and the 
expectations about future attacks affect household ownership of shares, bonds, business 
and life insurance.
21
 
When modeling the ownership of each asset we use a probit specification that 
includes  as  regressors,  in  addition  to  the  terrorism-related  variables,  a  rich  set  of 
household  attributes.  More  specifically,  we  control  for  age,  gender,  race,  marital  and 
labor force status, educational attainment, having children as well as income and wealth 
                                                 
18 As an example, the effect of depression on the probability of becoming a victim of bioterrorism becomes 
more than three times as large at 7.7 pp (significant at 1%), when estimated via the linear instrumental 
variables model. 
19 The results from these robustness checks as well as those from other checks discussed in subsequent 
sections are available upon request from the authors. 
20 Campbell (2006) provides an extensive discussion of recent developments in household finance. See also 
Hurd (2002), for an early analysis of the portfolios of elderly households using data from the AHEAD 
(Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest-Old) survey. 
21 It would be also interesting to study ownership transitions between 2000 and 2002, by estimating for 
example a two-stage Heckman selection model. However, this is infeasible in our case since the first stage 
would have to be estimated using data from the 2000 wave, while we do not have information on the 
terrorism-related variables in that year. Using instead only the relevant subsample in 2002 (e.g. the one 
consisting of owners in 2000, when studying transitions out of ownership) in order to estimate a probit for 
ownership would very likely lead to inconsistent estimates. This would happen because such a subsample 
would most probably not be representative of the population (due to selection on unobservables), which 
would make the error correlated with the characteristics of the sample.    16 
quartiles.
22 These variables represent a standard set of regressors that has been used, in 
earlier studies of household asset investment (see for example the empirical contributions 
in Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli, 2002). We also account for self-reported health and 
limitations  in  ADLs  (an  objective  health  indicator),  since  there  is  evidence  that 
households facing health problems are less likely to invest in shares (Rosen and Wu, 
2004). We include the sociability indicator of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004), namely 
whether  respondents  visit  their  neighbors,  because  these  authors  found  that  social 
interactions encourage stockholding by lowering information-related costs.    
Since attitudes towards risk are likely to influence asset investment decisions, we 
use information on risk aversion that can be gleaned from a series of income gamble 
questions with mean preserving spreads. In addition, the survey provides information on 
the  time  horizon  each  household  has  in  mind  when  making  investment  decisions. 
Unfortunately, in the 2002 HRS questions on both risk aversion and investment horizon 
are asked only of those that are aged 65 and lower. Given that age is exogenous, the 
subsamble  in  which  there  is  information  on  those  two  variables  is  produced  through 
stratification  by  an  exogenous  variable,  which  does  not  affect  the  consistency  of  our 
coefficient estimates (see for example Gourieroux and Jasiak, 2007).  
Recent research has emphasized the role of cognitive abilities on stockholding 
(see Christelis, Jappelli and Padula, 2008), and thus we include the recall and arithmetic 
scores already discussed in Section III. In a related vein, we add a dummy for regular 
internet usage because there is evidence that it encourages stockholding by providing 
cheaper access to financial information (Bogan, 2006). In addition, we use an indicator of 
being  depressed  as  a  measure  of  pessimism.  Since  we  have  already  showed  that 
depression is positively associated with perceptions about terrorist threats, by controlling 
for it we can examine the effects of the terrorism-related variables on asset choices net of 
pessimism and of a negative psychological outlook. Finally, we include a set of dummies 
representing the aforementioned nine US Census divisions.  
                                                 
22 Controlling for economic resources is dictated both by theory, with its emphasis on ‘cash on hand’ as a 
key determinant of asset investment, and by the need to avoid confounding the role of other variables 
included in the specification with that of income and wealth. In each specification we exclude from total 
net wealth the value of the asset in question in order to avoid endogeneity problems.   17 
It is important that our specification allow for different effects of terrorism across 
genders, since in Section III we have identified strong gender differences with respect to 
the perception of terrorist threats. These differences are consistent with existing evidence 
on  the  relationship  between  gender  and  emotional  reactions  involving  fear,  worry, 
anxiety  and  depression.  In  addition,  a  growing  literature  in  behavioral  finance  has 
recently emphasized the asymmetric way with which men and women perceive financial 
risks and make decisions about their investments. For instance, Barber and Odean (2001) 
show that men trade stocks excessively, given the large cost of frequent transactions. 
Furthermore, a number of studies have found that females tend to be more risk averse and 
worry more than men about financial decisions.
23 
Due to the above considerations, and since information for stocks, bonds (both 
can be held directly and indirectly through mutual funds and retirement accounts) and 
own business is available only at the household level, we estimate separate probit models 
for couples and singles. In the case of couples we include one terrorism-related term for 
each partner, while for singles we include the term and its interaction with a dummy for 
females.
24 On the other hand, information on life insurance is available at the respondent 
level. As a result, we estimate a probit for life-insurance on individuals, while controlling 
for  marital  status.  We  again  allow  for  gender-specific  effects  of  the  terrorism-related 
variables through appropriate interaction, and cluster standard errors at the household 
level.
25  
We use one terrorism-related variable at a time, due to their substantial conceptual 
overlap. Marginal effects for each of the three variables are shown in Table 3 (more 
details on the calculation of marginal effects are given in Appendix A.1). In order to keep 
our  specification  parsimonious,  we  use  a  binary  indicator  for  the  variable  denoting 
                                                 
23 For women’s propensity to assume lower risks see Jianakopoulos and Bernasek (1998) and Powell and 
Ansic (1997). For an overview of non-academic reports that highlight the differences in financial decision 
making  across  genders,  see  Table  1  in  Ricciardi  (2008),  who  also  reviews  the  literature  on  gender 
behavioral biases. 
24 Given the richness of our specification, the remaining characteristics in the case of couples represent a 
combination of the information from the two partners. In particular we use average age, worse reported 
health status, total number of limitations in daily activities and the maximum of: educational level, recall 
abilities, willingness to assume risk, investment horizon, familiarity in using the internet, frequency in 
visiting neighbors and depression. Furthermore, the household is determined to be in the labor force if any 
of the two partners is working. We have also run our regressions with separate terms for each partner and 
the results remain essentially unchanged. 
25 We compute robust standard errors for all specifications.   18 
insecurity due to terrorism, which is equal to one if the respondent feels very insecure and 
zero  otherwise.  If  not  for  this,  we  would  have  four  additional  terms  that  represent 
different  levels  of  insecurity,  for  both  couples  and  singles.  In  the  case  of  the  two 
continuous terrorism expectation variables, marginal effects represent the change in the 
probability of the asset choice of interest when the expectation increases by 10 pp. In the 
case  of  stocks,  bonds  and  own  business,  samples  contain  roughly  (there  are  small 
differences across specifications) 1,400 and 1,220 observations for couples and singles 
respectively, while for life insurance the sample size is approximately equal to 5,600. 
Women’s  perceived  sense  of  security  seems  to  have  economically  meaningful 
effects on the decision to invest in shares. In particular, we find that among couples the 
female partner’s perceived insecurity can negatively influence the household’s decision 
to invest in stocks by 7.3 pp. Given that the prevalence of stockholding among couples in 
the HRS is 56%, this effect is clearly economically significant, and it is estimated with 
precision as well. Furthermore, single women who are afraid of becoming victims of a 
bioterrorist  attack  exhibit  a  modestly  lower  probability  (1.2  pp)  to  invest  in  stocks, 
though  the  effect  is  less  precisely  estimated  (p-value:  0.06).  On  the  other  hand,  the 
general anticipation of a bioterrorist attack seems to influence positively the decision of 
both men and women in a couple to hold stocks, but the estimated magnitude (roughly 
equal to 0.75 pp) is not economically relevant. We find no effect of this expectation on 
singles either.  
We then examine whether the terrorism-related variables influence investments in 
bonds, which are considerably less risky financial instruments than shares, and owned by 
61% of couples and 39% of singles in the HRS sample. However, just as an investor 
could switch from stocks to bonds to reduce her portfolio’s riskiness, she could also 
switch from bonds to cash for the same purpose. Therefore, the effects of increased risk 
due to terrorism on bondholding could be of either sign. In our results, we find that for 
couples, the insecurity due to terrorism makes men more likely by 6.8 pp to hold bonds. 
This suggests that they view bonds as safer investment vehicles in times of increased 
uncertainty. As for singles, none of the terrorism-related variables we examine seems to 
have any effect on bond ownership.    19 
Private business equity represents a risky and illiquid household investment that is 
not very prevalent among either couples or singles (ownership rates in the HRS sample 
are about 13% and 5% respectively). However, as Gentry and Hubbard (2004) point out, 
private business owners form a group that is particularly important for aggregate asset 
demands and asset pricing. In the case of couples, none of the three terrorism-related 
variables seem to influence business ownership. On the other hand, we find that single 
males are strongly less likely (9.5 pp) to own a business when feeling very insecure in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. This result suggests that they view their business as not 
adequately  protected  from  the  consequences  of  terrorism  (e.g.  due  to  insufficient 
commercial insurance coverage), and thus feel compelled to sell it or close it down. 
When examining the effects of terrorism on ownership of life insurance (held by 
roughly 75% of males and 63% of females in the HRS sample), one needs to take into 
account the fact that life insurance policies typically do not contain terrorism exclusions, 
which also can not be added retrospectively. Hence, we would expect that the events of 
September 2001 would induce individuals to buy life insurance. Indeed, we find that the 
insecurity generated by terrorism makes females quite more likely (3.3 pp) to own a life 
insurance policy. Moreover, we find for males a statistically significant but economically 
unimportant (0.8 pp) positive effect of the general anticipation of a bioterrorist attack on 
having life insurance.  
To check the robustness of our results, and in order to add to our sample those 
aged  above  65,  we  also  estimated  probit  regressions  for  the  ownership  of  the 
aforementioned four assets excluding the variables denoting risk aversion and financial 
planning horizon.
26 We expect in any case to find some quantitative differences in the 
marginal effects with respect to those from the smaller sample. This may happen because 
in nonlinear models these effects depend on all characteristics of the sample units, and 
such characteristics can differ across the two samples (e.g. those above 65 have typically 
quite  lower  incomes  and  are  in  worse  health  than  their  younger  counterparts).  Our 
estimates about the negative influence of terrorism-induced insecurity on investment in 
risky  assets remain very relevant economically,  if a bit smaller in absolute value  for 
                                                 
26  This  increases  our  sample  size  to  roughly  4,080  and  4,640  observations  for  couples  and  singles 
respectively (for stocks, bonds and own business), and to 14,420 observations for life insurance.   20 
females in couples with respect to stockholding (3.2 pp, now less precisely estimated 
with a p-value equal to 0.059) and for single males with respect to business ownership 
(3.8 pp, p-value: 0.04). In addition, we now find quite strong and statistically significant 
negative effects of the aforementioned insecurity on stockholding for single females (3.3 
pp), and on business ownership for females in a couple (2.6 pp). On the other hand, males 
in a couple do not seem to be affected any more with respect to their investment in bonds 
when  feeling  insecure,  which  suggests  that  the  corresponding  strong  result  from  the 
smaller sample might not be very robust. Finally, the effects of the general expectation of 
a bioterrorist attack now become statistically insignificant for males in a couple, and even 
smaller (0.4 pp, p-value: 0.065) for their female partners.   
All in all, our results concerning asset investments are consistent with the notion 
that terrorism makes households less disposed to assume economic risks, and this drives 
them away from stocks (through females) and business ownership (mostly through single 
males). As already discussed, this result is consistent with aspects of both traditional 
expected utility theory (and its extensions) and prospect theory. Furthermore, one way for 
individuals to protect to some extent their families from the economic consequences of 
terrorism is to buy life insurance, and we see in our sample that this indeed happens for 
females. All the above effects are due to the insecurity felt in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, while the two expectation variables corresponding to Q2 and Q3 seem to have 
very little relevance for household asset investment. Finally, it is important to note that 
the estimated effects of the terrorism-related variables are net of the influence of several 
powerful predictors of financial choices like education, gender, race, health, financial 
attitudes  and  economic  resources,  and  thus  should  be  conservative  estimates  of  the 
impact of terrorism on household asset investments. 
 
V.  Household expenditure 
We now turn to the effect that the expectation and fear of terrorism have on the 
spending  patterns  of  HRS  households.  Since  2001  the  HRS  has  administered  the 
Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS), a supplemental survey sent by mail to 
a random sub-sample of HRS respondents in the year following the main interview, and   21 
in which households are asked to report expenditures over the previous 12 months.
27 We 
use data on expenditures from the 3,254 households that responded to the CAMS mailed 
out in the fall of 2003 and we combine it with the data from the 2002 HRS wave in order 
to examine the impact of perceptions about terrorism on household spending.  
  There could be a number of reasons why such an impact could be negative. First, 
as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  terrorism  represents  a  potential  negative  shock  to 
economic resources, and this could reduce household expenditure, especially on highly 
elastic goods. Second, terrorism represents a largely undiversifiable risk that increases the 
uncertainty  regarding  future  earnings  and  asset  income  flows,  and  thus  could  induce 
saving for precautionary reasons. Third, households could reduce spending on goods or 
activities that could leave them potentially exposed to terrorist attacks (e.g. travel or use 
of public transportation). On the other hand, households might spend more on goods and 
services that could counter the effects of terrorism (e.g. medications), or help avoiding 
them (e.g. use of the car instead of public transportation). In addition, the prospect of 
living  in  a  world  struck  by  terrorism  might  make  households  more  impatient,  thus 
inducing them to decrease their saving.
28 Hence, the overall effect of the fear of terrorism 
on household expenditure is a priori ambiguous. In any case, it would be also interesting 
to examine whether there is any shift in spending among different items.  
  We first examine the effect of the terrorism-related variables on total non-durable 
expenditure,  which  includes  spending  on  the  following  goods:  i)  food  at  home  and 
alcohol; ii) food outside the home; iii) clothing; iv) personal care products;
29 v) recreation 
(consisting of the sub-categories of spending on travel, tickets to movies and sporting 
events,  gyms  and  exercise  equipment,  and  hobbies);  vi)  vehicle  costs  (gasoline, 
maintenance,  insurance);  vii)  medical  expenses  (drugs,  supplies,  insurance,  services); 
viii) housing expenses (supplies, dry cleaning and laundry services, gardening supplies, 
gardening services, repair materials, repair and  maintenance services); ix) utility bills 
                                                 
27 For more details on the CAMS see Hurd and Rohwedder (2005).  
28 There is also evidence (see Lowenstein, 1996, 2000) that when individuals are under the influence of 
visceral factors, they often behave as if their discounting of the future has increased. 
29 These include hair care, shaving and skin products, as well as hair dresser and manicure services, but 
there are no separate questions on any of these items.    22 
(heating fuel, electricity, water and telephone); x) transfers to other family members; xi) 
charitable contributions.  
First,  we  ran  a  median  regression  of  the  logarithm  of  total  non-durable 
expenditure on the terrorism-related variables and various demographics typically used in 
previous studies of household expenditure (family size, age, self-reported health, race and 
education).
30 We found no statistically significant effect for any of the terrorism-related 
variables, either for couples or for singles. This result suggests that the already discussed 
conflicting effects of terrorism perceptions on expenditure may be canceling each other 
out. 
  We then examine the expenditure share of the aforementioned eleven major non-
durable categories, as well as the share of each item within them, by using the Quadratic 
Almost Ideal Demand System of Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997, henceforth BBL). 
BBL derive an estimating equation that relates the share of expenditure on each item to 
the logarithm of total non-durable expenditure and its square, plus demographics. Since 
the  expenditure  terms  are  likely  to  be  endogenous,  BBL  instrument  them  with  the 
logarithm of income and its square. We employ the same instruments as BBL in the 
context of the fractional variable model discussed in Section III, given that expenditure 
shares  are  bounded  between  zero  and  one.  Since  the  total  expenditure  variables  are 
continuous, we can use this time the instrumental variable procedure proposed by Papke 
and Wooldridge (2008).  
Our specification includes the demographic variables used earlier when modeling 
total non-durable expenditure.
31 As with the asset participation equations of Section IV, 
we allow asymmetric effects of the terrorism-related variables across genders, and thus 
we estimate models independently for couples (with separate terms for the 2 partners) 
and  singles  (interacting  the  terrorism-related  variables  with  gender).  Marginal  effects 
derived from our estimation are shown in Table 4 for nine of the major non-durables 
expenditure shares. We will also refer to the results from some of the various expenditure 
                                                 
30 See for example Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) and Browning and Collado (2007). 
31 In order to make our results robust to outliers, we drop observations with values of the expenditure shares 
at the top two percentiles of the distribution.   23 
sub-categories, but will not show them due to space constraints.
32 The estimation samples 
contain roughly 950 and 750 observations for couples and singles respectively. In order 
to facilitate the assessment of the economic significance of our results, we display in 
Table A.1 of the Appendix the median expenditure shares and amounts for each major 
expenditure item. 
Expenditure  on  food  at  home  and  alcohol,  food  outside  home,  and  medical 
expenses do not seem to be affected by the terrorism-related variables, neither for couples 
nor for singles. A very small (and significant at 10%) effect is found for the expectation 
of a bioterrorist attack in the US, which seems to induce the male in a couple to reduce 
clothing expenditure by 0.08 pp (3.7% of the median share (m.s.)). Quite stronger effects 
are found  for vehicle  costs for couples, where  insecurity  after 9/11 induces the male 
partner to increase the share of expenditure on vehicles by 2.5 pp (23.4% of the m.s.), 
mostly  through  additional  spending  on  gasoline.  Furthermore,  the  expectation  of  a 
bioterrorist attack in the US very slightly increases the share of expenditure on vehicles 
of both partners by 0.22 pp (2% of the m.s.), again through higher spending on gasoline. 
This evidence is consistent with a more intensive use of vehicles due to the potentially 
higher exposure to terrorism when traveling by public transportation. 
Recreational  activities  are  candidates  for  reduced  expenditure  because  of 
terrorism,  given  that  they  involve  being  in  public  places  and  possibly  using  public 
transportation.  In  addition,  they  are  largely  discretionary  expenditures  with  a  high 
elasticity of demand, and thus more likely to be affected by an expected drop in economic 
resources. We indeed find that, when expecting a bioterrorist attack in the US, male 
partners in a couple cut their share of recreational spending by 0.23 pp (4.1% of the m.s.), 
mostly  through  a  reduced  expenditure  share  for  travel  and  for  tickets  to  movies  and 
sporting events, while for the female partner the decline is by 0.18 pp (3.1% of the m.s. 
and significant at 10%) and is due to a reduced expenditure share for tickets. The fear of 
becoming a victim of a bioterrorist attack also makes female partners in a couple spend 
less on recreation by 0.37 pp (6.4% of the m.s.), again through decreased spending on 
travel and tickets.  
                                                 
32 The results for all expenditure categories not shown in Table 4 are available upon request from the 
authors.   24 
The terrorism-induced insecurity that is felt by the female in a couple increases 
the couple’s housing expenses by 2.8 pp (45.8% of the m.s.), mainly through the increase 
in the expenditure share of housing supplies and repairs. This result suggests that the 
female partner expects the couple to spend more time at home (possibly because it would 
feel more protected from terrorism therein) and hence wants the house to be in a good 
state. 
  Females in a couple who feel insecure because of terrorism increase their share of 
spending on personal care products by 0.4 pp (31.5% of the m.s.), which could reflect an 
attempt to feel better while living under the threat of terrorism.
33 On the other hand, 
single females decrease moderately their spending on these products by 0.11 pp (6.9% of 
the  m.s.,  p-value:  0.078)  when  expecting  to  become  victims  of  a  bioterrorist  attack, 
possibly because they have quite lower economic resources than couples and thus less 
margin to increase spending on discretionary items.  
  Finally,  charitable  contributions  and  expenses  on  utilities  do  not  seem  to  be 
affected with any economic or statistical significance by expectations and the insecurity 
due to terrorism, neither for couples nor for singles. On the other hand, we find positive 
effects on family transfers given by single males due to the expectation of a bioterrorist 
attack in the US (0.55 pp, 29.9% of the m.s.) and the expectation of becoming a victim of 
a bioterrorist attack (0.85 pp, 45.7% of the m.s.). 
  As a robustness check, we also run linear instrumental variable models as in BBL 
and found that, for both couples and singles, the effects of the terrorism-related variables 
were mostly very similar and sometimes quite stronger in terms of economic significance 
than  those  estimated  from  the  PW  model.
34  As  was  discussed  in  Section  III,  these 
stronger results are probably due to the linearity of the model, which ignores the bounded 
nature  of  the  expenditure  share  variables.  Therefore,  we  prefer  to  err  on  the  side  of 
cautiousness  and  present  the  estimates  from  the  PW  model  as  more  conservative 
estimates of the effect of the perceptions about terrorism on household expenditure. 
 
                                                 
33  We  also  find  a  negative  but  economically  insignificant  effect  of  the  fear  of  becoming  a  victim  on 
personal care spending by females in a couple. 
34 As an example, females in a couple were found in the linear model to reduce the share of expenditure on 
recreation  by  3  pp  (p-value:  0.035)  when  expecting  to  become  a  victim  of  a  bioterrorist  attack.  This 
estimate is roughly eight times larger in absolute value than the one obtained from the PW model.   25 
VI.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have used micro data from the HRS in which respondents are 
asked questions on their insecurity and expectations about terrorism in the aftermath of 
9/11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks that took place in the US. We use this person-
level information in order to explore the factors that shape individuals’ perceptions about 
terrorism and to quantify the effects that terrorism has on household portfolio choices and 
spending patterns.  
We find that individuals who could be in a better position to acquire and process 
information  about  terrorist  threats  (due  to  higher  education,  better  numeracy  skills, 
previous military experience or large economic resources), tend to worry less about their 
personal security and more about the threat to the country as a whole. On the other hand, 
being a female, Jewish and having reduced numeracy skills, all make individuals fear 
about themselves but do not increase their expectation about a bioterrorist attack in the 
US in general. We also find that depression and religious devotion induce fear both at the 
personal level and for the nation. Finally, we show that the passage of time and reduced 
memory ability tend to alleviate the insecurity created by 9/11, but they do not seem to 
influence the fear of being a victim of bioterrorism. Our evidence could help to identify 
which population groups might be psychologically vulnerable to the threat of terrorist 
attacks and thus could be of use to policy makers. 
Another result of our analysis is that insecurity due to terrorism has important 
negative  effects  on  household  stock  investment.  These  effects  are  channeled  through 
females, who also tend to buy life insurance when feeling insecure. In addition, fear of 
terrorism makes single men quite less likely to own a business. These results suggest that 
terrorism reduces households’ appetite for economic risk, as predicted both by traditional 
and more recent behavioral models of financial decision-making. Hence, an appropriate 
policy  response  to  this  phenomenon  would  be  to  introduce  measures  that  will  make 
owners  of  those  two  assets  feel  more  protected  from  the  economic  consequences  of 
terrorism  (e.g.  cheaper  and  more  extensive  commercial  insurance  coverage),  and 
therefore less hesitant to assume financial risk. 
 With  regard  to  household  non-durable  expenditure,  while  we  find  no  overall 
effect of the terrorism-related variables, we observe a shifting of spending from goods   26 
that can potentially leave one exposed to a terrorist attack (travel and other recreational 
activities) towards  goods that might help to cope with the consequences of terrorism 
materially (car and spending on the house) or psychologically (personal care products 
used by females in a couple). 
Our study, apart from offering new evidence on the economic implications of 
terrorism at the micro level, may also provide insights into economic decisions taken by 
households when facing extremely uncertain events that may cause considerable fear and 
hardship.  Our  analysis  points  in  particular  to  the  fact  that  men  and  women,  when 
experiencing  the  same  extreme  event,  form  quite  different  expectations  and  exhibit 
different levels of insecurity, which often result in divergent economic behavior. Such 
asymmetry  in  economic  reactions  across  genders  merits  further  investigation  and 
highlights the need to consider heterogeneity in additional characteristics (e.g. education, 
cognitive abilities and marital status) and expectation formation when modeling saving 
and portfolio choices over the lifecycle.     27 
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Appendix A.1. Calculation of marginal effects 
Given that marginal effects are nonlinear functions of the estimated parameters β ˆ, 
we compute their point estimates and standard errors via Monte Carlo simulation (Train, 
2003), by using the formula  
 
β β β β d f g g E ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ∫ =  
 
where g(β ) denotes the marginal effect of interest and f(β ) the joint distribution of all 
the elements in  β . We implement this simulation estimator by drawing 1,000 times from 
the  joint  distribution  of  the  vector  of  parameters  β ˆ  under  the  assumption  that  it  is  
asymptotically normal with mean and variance-covariance matrix equal to the maximum 
likelihood  estimates.  For  a  given  parameter  draw  j  we  generate  the  marginal  effect 
corresponding to each unit in our sample and then calculate the average marginal effect 
g(
j β ˆ ) as the weighted average (using sample weights) across units.
35 We then estimate 
E(g(β )) and its standard error as the mean and standard deviation respectively of the 
distribution of g(
j β ˆ ) over all parameter draws.  
  When  estimating  the  regressions  for  singles  in  Sections  IV  and  V,  marginal 
effects for females and males are computed by using the observations in the respective 
subsamples. Since in the case of singles there is an interaction term of the terrorism-
related variable of interest and the female dummy, marginal effects for single females 
show the change in the relevant magnitudes when the values of both the non-interacted 
and interacted term are modified as specified in the text. 
   
 
 
                                                 
35 We do not evaluate marginal effects at sample means since this practice can lead to severely misleading 
results (see Train, 2003, pp. 33-34).   33 
Table 1: Distribution of answers to Q1-Q3 across selected characteristics of 
the survey respondents 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not at all 
insecure
Very 
insecure
Aged 50 - 65 0.16 0.18 0.63 0.21
Aged 65 plus 0.19 0.16 0.59 0.17
Male 0.25 0.11 0.61 0.14
Female 0.12 0.21 0.61 0.22
Depressed 0.15 0.27 0.63 0.22
Not depressed 0.18 0.15 0.60 0.18
Visits neighbours 0.16 0.17 0.60 0.19
Does not visit neighbours 0.20 0.17 0.62 0.20
Uses Internet regularly 0.16 0.12 0.63 0.19
Not a regular Internet user 0.18 0.19 0.60 0.19
Has children 0.17 0.17 0.61 0.19
No children 0.20 0.14 0.60 0.19
Religious very important 0.15 0.20 0.61 0.21
Religion not very important 0.21 0.12 0.61 0.16
Veteran 0.27 0.10 0.62 0.14
Not a veteran 0.14 0.19 0.60 0.21
White 0.17 0.15 0.62 0.18
African American 0.15 0.34 0.55 0.23
Other race 0.20 0.23 0.58 0.23
Less than high school 0.18 0.25 0.57 0.20
High school graduate 0.16 0.17 0.62 0.20
College graduate 0.20 0.10 0.62 0.16
Couple 0.17 0.15 0.61 0.18
Widow 0.17 0.21 0.58 0.18
Never married 0.22 0.16 0.60 0.23
Retired 0.19 0.17 0.60 0.18
Working 0.17 0.15 0.63 0.20
1st income quartile 0.19 0.24 0.58 0.20
2nd income quartile 0.17 0.19 0.59 0.20
3d income quartile 0.18 0.16 0.62 0.19
4th income quartile 0.16 0.11 0.63 0.17
1st wealth quartile 0.18 0.23 0.59 0.21
2nd wealth quartile 0.18 0.19 0.61 0.20
3d wealth quartile 0.18 0.15 0.61 0.19
4th wealth quartile 0.16 0.13 0.62 0.17
New England 0.16 0.16 0.63 0.20
Middle Atlantic 0.15 0.23 0.59 0.21
South Atlantic 0.17 0.20 0.61 0.20
East North Central 0.17 0.14 0.61 0.19
East South Central 0.18 0.21 0.60 0.21
West North Central 0.17 0.12 0.60 0.17
West South Central 0.17 0.19 0.62 0.19
Mountain 0.20 0.11 0.63 0.17
Pacific 0.20 0.12 0.60 0.16
Protestant 0.17 0.17 0.61 0.19
Jewish 0.13 0.23 0.61 0.22
Catholic 0.16 0.18 0.60 0.19
Other religions 0.28 0.19 0.57 0.16
No religious preference 0.25 0.11 0.64 0.17
Variable
Personal Sense of 
Security
Expectation of a 
Bioterrorist 
Attack in the US
Expectation to 
Become a Victim 
of a Bioterrorist 
Attack
 
Note:  Columns  1  and  2  display  weighted  sample  proportions,  while  columns  3  and  4 
weighted sample means. 
Source: 2002 HRS.          34 
Table 2: Marginal effects of characteristics on the three terrorism-related 
variables 
 
(1) (3) (5) (7)
Marg. 
Effect
Marg. 
Effect
Marg. 
Effect
Marg. 
Effect
Age 0.002 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** -0.002 0.000 ***
Female -0.104 0.007 *** 0.095 0.006 *** 0.010 0.007 0.071 0.005 ***
Depressed -0.056 0.006 *** 0.063 0.007 *** 0.039 0.007 *** 0.024 0.006 ***
Visits neighbours -0.030 0.005 *** 0.027 0.005 *** -0.016 0.006 *** -0.001 0.004
Uses internet regularly 0.018 0.005 *** -0.017 0.005 *** 0.008 0.006 -0.005 0.004
Has children -0.007 0.011 0.007 0.010 -0.004 0.013 -0.003 0.009
Religion very important -0.037 0.005 *** 0.034 0.005 *** 0.015 0.005 *** 0.029 0.004 ***
Veteran 0.014 0.007 * -0.013 0.007 * 0.026 0.008 *** -0.005 0.006
African American -0.054 0.007 *** 0.063 0.009 *** -0.080 0.009 *** 0.011 0.007
Other race -0.012 0.014 0.012 0.014 -0.039 0.014 *** 0.025 0.013 *
High school graduate 0.014 0.006 ** -0.015 0.007 ** 0.019 0.007 *** 0.000 0.006
College graduate 0.050 0.008 *** -0.046 0.008 *** 0.007 0.010 -0.013 0.007 *
Couple -0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008 -0.024 0.008 *** -0.008 0.007
Widow -0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.010 -0.018 0.008 **
Never married 0.016 0.018 -0.013 0.016 -0.009 0.021 0.020 0.016
Retired -0.013 0.006 ** 0.012 0.006 ** 0.011 0.007 0.020 0.005 ***
Working -0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.021 0.006 ***
2nd income quartile -0.006 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.022 0.009 ** 0.009 0.006
3d income quartile 0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.008 0.043 0.009 *** 0.011 0.007
4th income quartile -0.002 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.044 0.011 *** 0.001 0.008
2nd wealth quartile 0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.006
3d wealth quartile -0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.006
4th wealth quartile -0.013 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.009 -0.007 0.007
Middle Atlantic 0.001 0.011 -0.002 0.013 -0.051 0.013 *** -0.002 0.010
South Atlantic 0.013 0.011 -0.015 0.012 -0.035 0.013 *** -0.023 0.010 **
East North Central 0.036 0.011 *** -0.038 0.012 *** -0.037 0.013 *** -0.027 0.011 ***
East South Central 0.005 0.014 -0.006 0.016 -0.051 0.015 *** -0.004 0.013
West North Central 0.041 0.012 *** -0.041 0.013 *** -0.047 0.014 *** -0.034 0.011 ***
West South Central 0.027 0.012 ** -0.028 0.013 ** -0.024 0.014 * -0.027 0.011 **
Mountain 0.059 0.014 *** -0.056 0.013 *** -0.016 0.015 -0.040 0.011 ***
Pacific 0.044 0.012 *** -0.044 0.013 *** -0.055 0.014 *** -0.041 0.010 ***
Protestant 0.001 0.026 -0.003 0.025 0.020 0.026 -0.011 0.020
Jewish -0.090 0.028 *** 0.122 0.032 *** 0.009 0.032 0.050 0.024 **
Catholic -0.022 0.026 0.020 0.025 -0.012 0.026 -0.009 0.021
No religious preference 0.039 0.028 -0.034 0.026 0.029 0.028 -0.010 0.022
Number of ADL's -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.004 ** 0.003 0.003
Word recall score -0.003 0.001 ** 0.003 0.001 ** 0.005 0.002 *** 0.001 0.001
Numeracy score 0.006 0.001 *** -0.006 0.001 *** 0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.001 **
Months after 9/11 (log) 0.003 0.001 ** -0.003 0.001 ** -0.003 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001
Number of observations 15,289 14,206 13,962
Variable
Personal Sense of Security Expectation of a 
Bioterrorist Attack 
in the US
Expectation to 
Become a Victim of 
a Bioterrorist 
Attack
Not at all insecure Very insecure
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
(2) (4) (6) (8)
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3. Marginal effects of the three terrorism-related variables on household asset investments 
 
(1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11)
M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff.
Male 0.051 0.031 0.008 0.004 ** -0.001 0.006 -0.073 0.059 0.003 0.008 -0.009 0.010
Female -0.073 0.028 *** 0.007 0.004 * 0.004 0.005 -0.033 0.035 -0.006 0.005 -0.011 0.006 *
Male 0.067 0.033 ** -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.035 0.066 0.001 0.008 -0.004 0.010
Female -0.011 0.028 0.007 0.004 * -0.003 0.005 0.001 0.034 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.006
Male 0.016 0.031 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.006 -0.095 0.017 *** -0.002 0.005 -0.005 0.008
Female -0.016 0.023 -0.004 0.003 0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.018 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.004
Male -0.026 0.024 0.008 0.003 *** 0.003 0.004
Female 0.033 0.017 ** 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003
Shares
Bonds
Own 
Business
Life 
Insurance
Std. Error
Couples
Panel A. By Family Kind
Singles
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Panel B. Individuals
(12)
Insecure
Expectation of a 
Bioterrorist 
Attack in the US
Expectation to 
become a victim 
of a bioterrorist 
attack
Insecure
Expectation of a 
Bioterrorist 
Attack in the US
Expectation to 
become a victim 
of a bioterrorist 
attack
(4) (6) (8) (10)
Asset Gender
(2)
Std. Error
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  36 
Table 4. Marginal effects of the three terrorism-related variables on household expenditure 
 
(1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11)
M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff. M. Eff.
Male 0.0001 0.0142 0.0006 0.0018 -0.0053 0.0038 -0.1580 0.1129 0.0032 0.0042 -0.0026 0.0085
Female 0.0043 0.0144 0.0022 0.0016 0.0028 0.0024 0.0206 0.0177 0.0031 0.0049 -0.0002 0.0040
Male 0.0019 0.0050 -0.0008 0.0004 * -0.0005 0.0010 0.0229 0.0806 0.0000 0.0016 0.0009 0.0026
Female 0.0034 0.0036 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0047 0.0050 -0.0013 0.0023 -0.0006 0.0014
Male 0.0151 0.0096 0.0006 0.0008 0.0023 0.0019 0.0618 0.1383 0.0010 0.0024 0.0007 0.0029
Female -0.0025 0.0063 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0013 0.0010 0.0027 0.0082 0.0010 0.0019 0.0016 0.0014
Male -0.0004 0.0019 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0050 0.0227 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009 0.0008
Female 0.0041 0.0016 *** 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0002 *** -0.0001 0.0119 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0006 *
Male -0.0004 0.0087 -0.0023 0.0009 *** 0.0015 0.0019 -0.0024 0.0613 -0.0004 0.0028 -0.0071 0.0052
Female -0.0049 0.0067 -0.0018 0.0010 * -0.0037 0.0013 *** -0.0029 0.0059 -0.0007 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0014
Male -0.0176 0.0115 -0.0002 0.0012 -0.0016 0.0026 0.0483 0.1817 -0.0038 0.0030 0.0040 0.0055
Female 0.0128 0.0111 0.0020 0.0014 0.0003 0.0018 0.0075 0.0152 -0.0015 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0027
Male -0.0045 0.0129 0.0002 0.0011 0.0020 0.0024 0.0608 0.0925 -0.0035 0.0024 0.0032 0.0034
Female 0.0281 0.0113 *** -0.0010 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0016 0.0096 0.0109 -0.0025 0.0015 -0.0019 0.0020
Male 0.0248 0.0110 ** 0.0022 0.0009 *** 0.0020 0.0018 -0.0413 0.0646 -0.0018 0.0034 -0.0057 0.0036
Female -0.0047 0.0070 0.0022 0.0008 *** 0.0019 0.0012 -0.0071 0.0097 0.0033 0.0035 -0.0006 0.0021
Vehicle 
Costs
Medical 
Expenses
Housing 
Expenses
Personal 
Care
Recreation
Clothing
Food 
Outside 
Home
Couples Singles
Food at 
Home and 
Alcohol
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Expectation to 
become a victim of a 
bioterrorist attack
Insecure
Expectation of a 
Bioterrorist Attack 
in the US
Expectation to 
become a victim of a 
bioterrorist attack
(6) (8) (10) (12)
Item Gender
(2) (4)
Insecure
Expectation of a 
Bioterrorist Attack 
in the US
Std. Error Std. Error
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  37 
Table A.1. Median Shares and Amounts of Annual 
Non-durable Expenditure for Major Items 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median 
Share
Median 
Value
Median 
Share
Median 
Value
1,455
Utilities 0.1232 3,429 0.1638 2,304
Vehicle Costs 0.1061 2,894 0.0943
1,944
Housing 
Expenses
0.0616 1,594 0.0600 800
Medical 
Expenses
0.1218 3,700 0.1121
240
Recreation 0.0571 1,560 0.0262 395
Personal Care 0.0131 400 0.0162
360
Food Outside 
Home
0.0296 720 0.0220 300
Clothing 0.0218 600 0.0222
Item
Couples Singles
Food at Home 0.0784 1,800 0.0762 1,000
15,306
Total Nodurable 
Expenditure
-..- 30,763 -..-
 
Note: Median shares are computed as the weighted median of the shares across 
sample  units.  Medians  of  sub-aggregate  items  do  not  add  up  in  general  to  the 
median of the corresponding aggregate magnitude.  
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